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Monitoring Employees for Genetic
Alteration: Is State Regulation Essential?
In the past decade, the California Legislature has manifested a clear
interest in the eradication of occupationally induced disease.' Despite
this legislative resolve, reported incidents of occupationally induced
diseases continue to increase. 2 One explanation for the continued in-
crease in occupational disease is the introduction and manufacture
1. See CAL_. LAB. CODE §6300. The Labor Code provides:
The California Safety and Health Act of 1973 is hereby enacted for the purpose
of assuring safe and healthful working conditions for all California working men
and women by authorizing the enforcement of effective standards, assisting and en-
couraging employers to maintain safe and healthful working conditions, and by pro-
viding for research, information, education, training, and enforcement in the field
of occupational safety and health. Id.
The Hazardous Substances Information and Training Act provides for the development and
dissemination of information about the contents and properties of specific hazardous substances
for the purpose of reducing preventable health risks. Id. §6361. In addition, the California
Legislature has enacted section 429.11 of the California Health & Safety Code that provides:
The State Department of Health Services shall maintain a program of occupational
health and occupational disease prevention including but not limited to the following:
(a) Investigations into the causes of morbidity and mortality from work induced
diseases.
(b) Development of recommendations for improved control of work-induced
diseases.
(c) Maintenance of a thorough knowledge of the effects of industrial chemicals
and work practices on the health of California workers.
(d) Provision of technical assistance in matters of occupational disease preven-
tion and control to the Department of Industrial Relations and other governmental
and non-governmental agencies, organizations, and private individuals.
(e) Collection and summarization of statistics describing the causes and prevalence
of work induced diseases in California.
The functions provided for above are intended to implement within the department
a continuing research and development capability which will reinforce and strengthen
the administration of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, including the capability
to recommend occupational health standards to the California Occupational Safety
and Health Standards Board. Id.
2. Occupational disease and illness accounted for the loss of 850,000 workdays in 1981
nationwide. BUaRAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, But. 2164, OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES IN TH UNrED STATES BY INDUSTRY 1981 at, 14 (1983). The most recent California
illness and disease statistics provide that 44,414 reports of occupational disease were submitted
to the Division of Labor Statistics in 1978, while 43,888 reports were submitted in 1977. Div.
oF LAB. STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, CAL. DEP'T OF INDUSTiPL RELATIONS, OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
IN CAL. 1978, at 12 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1978 DISEASE STATsTICs]; Div. OF LAB. STATISTICS
AND RESEARCH, CAL. DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN CAL. 1977,
at 10 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1977 DIsEAsE STATISTICS]. Both California publications note
that diseases with long latency periods are not well recognized as being work related and are
less frequently reported as occupational illnesses. See 1978 DISEASE STATISTICS, supra note 2,
at 2, and 1977 DIsEAsE STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 1.
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of thousands of new chemicals since the end of World War II.1 For
many years, researchers have suspected that some of these chemical
agents are a cause of occupational diseases such as cancer, anemia,
and serious birth defects in worker offspring.4 Only recently, however,
has a direct connection between certain chemicals and disease been
established.5 Research data demonstrate that exposures to certain
chemicals can cause changes to a worker's chromosomal structure,6
and that as these chromosomes replicate and increase in number,7
the likelihood that an affected worker will contract cancer, anemia,
or produce children with birth defects increases.' Concomitant with
the development of information about the link between chemical ex-
posures and disease, scientists have devised medical tests9 which can
be administered to workers to identify those who have an increased
susceptibility'0 to disease because of the genetic changes to cells."
Under existing statutes and case law,' 2 an employer has no duty
to conduct genetic tests to determine increased susceptibility to disease.' 3
Although a few employers voluntarily conduct genetic tests,' 4 more
testing is essential if California is to succeed in reducing incidents
of occupational disease. Due to a belief that testing will increase risks
of liability,'5 the number of voluntary programs will not likely in-
crease. Without testing, however, workers will continue to be ignorant
about an important element of their health status.
3. ASPEN SYSmEmS CORP., CENTER FOR COMPUANCE INFORMATION, Tomc SUSTANCES CON-
TROL SOURCEBOOK 3 (1978). Since World War II ended, there has been dramatic development
of synthetic organic chemicals. There are presently two million recognized chemical compounds,
and over 30,000 chemical substances in commerce. Id. It is estimated that 1000 new chemicals
are introduced in the marketplace each year. Id.
4. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
9. This comment will discuss those tests that are referred to as the field of "cytogenetic
testing." See generally CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSEsSIIENT,
THE RoLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN THE PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 67-75 (1983)
(a thorough study by the Office of Technology Assessment of issues relating to genetic testing,
with options for Congressional action presented) [hereinafter cited as RoLE OF GENETIC TESTING].
The more descriptive term, genetic monitoring, will be used in this comment in lieu of the
more technical terminology.
10. In the medical and scientific community, the terms "hypersusceptible," "susceptible,"
"high risk," and "sensitive" can have different meanings. See id. at 27. These words and
the term "increased risk" will be used interchangeably to describe a higher than average pro-
bability that disease will be contracted.
11. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
12. No statutes or case law address the question of genetic monitoring. See Goodrich,
Are Your Genes Right for Your Job?, CAL. LAWYER, May, 1983 at 26. The view that federal
OSHA required genetic testing has been abandoned. See infra note 28.
13. Goodrich, supra note 12, at 26.
14. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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Authority to adopt administrative regulations pertaining to the safety
and health of the workplace is vested in the Occupational Safety and
Health Standards Board.1 6 This comment recommends that the Board
adopt administrative regulations' 7 that would provide for a program
of mandatory administration of medical tests by certain employers"8
to determine whether employees have experienced genetic alterations
because of exposures in the workplace. Genetic tests should be made
compulsory for those workers for whom occupational exposures pre-
sent the dangers of contracting identifiable diseases such as cancer
and anemia, or of producing serious birth defects in children.
Initially, this comment will describe the scientific data which
demonstrate that the presently available technology can produce ac-
curate results predictive of increased risk of disease.1 9 This comment
will next examine the implications for employees if testing is not
governmentally regulated.20 Genetic testing is presently discretionary
with employers, and few employers offer employees the opportunity
to determine whether exposures in the workplace are affecting their
health status.2" Finally, this comment will recommend that ad-
ministrative regulations be adopted under the California Occupational
Safety and Health Act (hereinafter referred to as Cal-OSHA)22 to man-
date testing in those industries where employee exposures create a risk
of contracting diseases that result from chromosomal alterations.23
Pertinent statutory provisions and administrative regulations providing
the foundation for the incorporation of a genetic testing program will be
described.2 ' In addition, the final section will recommend the inclu-
sion of certain key provisions within the mandatory program.2 5 First,
however, the available scientific data must be reviewed to demonstrate
that the testing methods are sufficiently perfected to permit regulation.
16. The Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board is under the direction of the
Division of Occupational Safety and Health. See infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
17. See CAL. LAB. CODE §142.3(d). when appropriate, type and frequency of medical ex-
aminations or other tests can be required. They are to be completed at the employer's expense
for the purpose of determining whether the employee's health has been adversely affected by
exposures in the work environment. Id.
18. Identification of specific employers or industries that would be affected by any regula-
tions adopted is beyond the scope of this comment. The effects of some chemical agents on
chromosomes, however, is discussed. See infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text. This com-
ment does not suggest that industries that generate exposure to these chemical agents would
necessarily be affected by any regulations.
19. See infra notes 26-67 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 89-174 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
22. CAL. LAB. CODE §§6300-6708. The purpose of Cal-OSHA is to assure safe and healthful
working conditions for all California working men and women. Id. §6300.
23. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 194-222 and accompanying text.
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I. SCIENTIcI DATA
Scientific data demonstrating that chromosomal alterations are a
causal factor in diseases such as cancer and anemia and in the produc-
tion of birth defects in offspring has been evolving for some time. 26
Two particular tests have emerged that industry can utilize to iden-
tify heightened susceptibility to disease. Although the administration
and laboratory analysis for both these types of tests are the same, 27
the tests differ in purpose. These two types, genetic screening tests
and genetic monitoring tests, are next described.
A. Genetic Screening and Genetic Monitoring
Genetic screening2s is a form of genetic testing that is designed to
identify persons susceptible to disease in certain work settings because
of pre-existing or inherited genetic traits. 29 Screening is a one-time
procedure usually performed in conjunction with a preemployment
physical examination. One of the key purposes of genetic screening
is to prevent susceptible workers from entering a potentially hazard-
ous workplace.3'
26. See ROLE OF GENETIc TESTING, supra note 9, at 67-75.
27. Changes to chromosomes can be detected by analyzing blood under precise laboratory
conditions. See id. at 57; Severo, Genetic Tests by Industry Raise Questions on Rights of Workers,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1980, at Al, col. 1. Blood tests are frequently required in mandatory
medical surveillance programs. See, e.g., CAL. ADMN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5216, App. B, VIII.
Blood tests are required for lead exposure. Id. R. 5214(n)(2)(D), 5214(n)(3)(A)(4). A complete
blood count is required as part of the periodic monitoring program for inorganic arsenic. Id.
R. 5212(m)(B). Medical surveillance for dibromo-3-chloropropane should include tests for blood
dyserasias. Id. R. 5210(k)(1)(C)(1-5). Blood tests required for exposure to vinyl chloride. Id.
28. See ROLE OF GENETIc TEsTING, supra note 9, at 89-105 (for a discussion of types of
characteristics which can be identified by genetic screening). See generally McGarity and Schroeder,
Risk Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEx. L. REv. 999, 1010-12 (1981) (for a discussion
of the types of genetic screens used in chemical industries). McGarity and Schroeder conclude
that "courts should apply stricter scrutiny to employers' justifications for screens and examine
possible alternatives to restrictive screens, such as more sensitive screens or capital expenditures
to increase safety." Id. at 1003. Some believed, however, that at one time OSHA mandated
genetic screening. Severo, Federal Mandate for Gene Tests Disturbs U.S. Safety Official, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1980, at Al, col. 7. OSHA, however, stated that the purpose of the language
of the regulation was to have physicians conducting medical screening examinations inquire
into "family and occupational background, including genetic and environmental factors."
Bingham, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1980, at A20, col. 5. One writer con-
tends that genetic screening is per se unlawful unless two conditions are met: (1) the employer
finds that it is not feasible to maintain a workplace safe and healthful for the hypersusceptible,
and (2) the employer can show that a business necessity exists which justifies the exclusion.
Note, Genetic Testing in Employment: Employee Protection of Threat, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1187, 1189 (1981).
29. See ROLE OF GENETC TESTING, supra note 9, at 23; see also McGarity and Schroeder,
supra note 28, at 1010-12. Employers in the chemical industry have occasionally screened potential
employees for evidence of genetic susceptibility to industrial diseases. Id.
30. See ROLE OF GENETIc TESTING, supra note 9, at 57.
31. Id. at 8.
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Genetic monitoring, on the other hand, is genetic testing that will
identify persons who experience genetic alterations because of ex-
posures in the work environment. 32 Monitoring entails the periodic
testing of workers, initially to establish baseline information about
chromosomal structure and subsequently to assess damage to the
worker's dioxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or chromosomes from exposure
to hazardous agents. 33 Of the two types of genetic testing, genetic
monitoring is the type which is directly oriented toward the
maintenance of employee health.
Although genetic screening programs would provide useful infor-
mation about a potential employee's health status, a regulation compel-
ling employers to conduct screening tests would probably not survive
legal challenge. 34 Genetic screening programs tend to curtail employment
opportunities for workers with certain ethnic and racial backgrounds
because certain genetic aberrations are more common among these
groups. 3  For example, a genetic screening program could be designed
to identify victims of sickle cell condition,36 which would single out
a proportionately large number of black applicants.3 7 A similar test
that would identify a chromosomal aberration known as
glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G-6-PD) deficiency 3 would single
out males of black, Filipino, and Mediterranean Jewish 39 origin.40 To
prevent the discriminatory results that can occur in genetic screen-
ing programs due to differentiation along racial and ethnic lines, four
32. Id. at 67.
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
35. For instance, glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency will affect 16 percent of
Black American males, 12-13 percent of Filipinos, and 11 percent of Mediterranean Jews. Only
0.1 percent of white American males are affected. See RoLE oF GEnETic TESTING, supra note
9, at 124.
36. Sickle cell conditions result from an abnormal hemoglobin molecule. Sickle cell anemia
can cause a shortened life span and affects about 0.2 to 0.5 percent of American Blacks. Sickle
cell trait causes only minimal health hazards and appears in about 8 percent of Black Americans.
RoLE OF GENEnc TnSTn G, supra note 9, at 91. Sickle cell testing was performed by the Du-
Pont Company from 1972 until 1981. Testing was started at the request of black employees.
Severo, Screening of Blacks by DuPont Sharpens Debate on Genetic Tests, N.Y. Times, Feb.
4, 1980, at Al, col. 5. The testing was discontinued in 1981. Goodrich, supra note 12, at 27.
37. Severo, supra note 36, at Al, col. 5.
38. See supra note 35. When G-6-PD deficiencies develop, anemia results. Testing for G-6-PD
was conducted by the DuPont Company from 1974 until 1981 when the tests were discon-
tinued. See Goodrich, supra note 12, at 27. No data are available that indentify companies
that have or do now conduct G-6-PD screening, although industries interested in G-6-PD screening
include manufactures of dyes, metals, and drugs. RoLE op GEannc TESING, supra note 9, at 90.
39. RoLE oF GENEC TESTnNG, supra note 9; at 90.
40. Genetic screening programs can test for a wide range of heritable traits, most of which
are not recognized or understood by the lay public. Id. at 89-99 (for a summary of the traits
for which testing is available).
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states have adopted laws that prohibit discrimination based on iden-
tification of genetic abnormalities from screening. 41 Absent this type
of proscriptive legislation, a worker identified as suffering genetic aber-
rations pursuant to a genetic screening program would probably still
be able to wage a successful discrimination suit under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 No case law addresses genetic screen-
ing programs directly. The United States Supreme Court, 3 however,
has opined that a successful discrimination claim can be waged if a
plaintiff can demonstrate that the "tests in question select applicants
for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different than the
pool of applicants.'" 4  If the affected worker were able to identify
a disparate impact,'  no showing of discriminatory motive would be
required.46 Thus, although genetic screening arguably can safeguard
the health of prospective employees, the screening nevertheless could
discriminate against certain protected classes. Compelled screening pro-
grams should not be considered at this time.
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. §448.075; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §1002; N.C. GEN. STAT. §95.28.1
(prohibiting employment discrimination based on a sickle cell anemia characteristic); N.J. REv.
STAT. §10:5-12 (prohibiting discrimination against any person who carries atypical hereditary
blood traits, specifying sickle cell, hemoglobin-C, Tay Sachs, thalessemia, and cystic fibrosis).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-17.
43. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
44. 401 U.S. at 436.
45. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two types of employment discrimination claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e-17: disparate impact
and disparate treatment. In Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court discussed
the provisions of a disparate impact claim, holding that standardized tests that were not
demonstrated to measure job capability and disqualified black applicants at a substantially higher
rate than white applicants offended Title VII. Id. at 436. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the court stated that to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff must show that "tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion
in a racial pattern significantly different from the pool of applicants." (citing Griggs). Id. at 802.
If the employer shows that the tests administered are job related, the employee may still prevail
if the employee shows that "other tests or selection devices without a similarly undesirable
racial effect" would also satisfy the employer's "legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship." Id. The Court in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) reiterated
the Griggs holdings and further stated that discriminatory motive need not be shown. See also
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Disparate
treatment claims require that a plaintiff show discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Brotherhood
of Teamsters at 335 n.15 (1977). Discriminatory motive claims occur when an employer acts
less favorably to one group of persons than other groups because of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a)(1). If the plaintiff is successful in showing discrim-
inatory motive and that a protected class is being treated differently, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer who may prevail if a nondiscriminatory business reason exists for the exclusion. E.g., Mc-
Donell Douglas at 802-03 (1973). Based on the foregoing discussion, a worker identified as suscep-
tible in a genetic monitoring program is unlikely to prevail under either a disparate impact
or disparate treatment theory. Disparate impact cases appear to arise only in relationship to
preemployment criteria, and thus would not be applicable to a genetic monitoring program.
Disparate treatment would also not be applicable because monitoring results do not affect any
protected class with greater frequency than any other group of people.
46. See supra note 45.
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Conversely, discrimination actions are unlikely under a genetic
monitoring program because no single racial or ethnic population ex-
periences genetic alternations more frequently than does any other
group.4 7 In order to appreciate the need for a mandatory genetic
monitoring program, a brief discussion of the mechanics and conse-
quences of genetic alteration is required.
B. Scientific Background
A purpose of genetic monitoring in the workplace is to identify
employees whose cells have become malignant. 8 Exposure to some
toxic substances 49 and ionizing radiations" has been shown to cause
initial changes in human cells either by altering the structure of the
chromosomes or changing the number of chromosomes within a cell.5
The cells replicate, and malignancies can evolve as the number of
altered cells increases.52 The likelihood of disease, therefore, is in-
creased because fewer changes to a cell are required before disease
results.
Some genetic damage is reversible. If the affected individual is
removed from the site of the exposure, chromosomal damage
sometimes can be prevented53 because the natural repair mechanism
of the body can eliminate the harm by healing the damaged
chromosomes. 4 The affected person must be removed from the hazard-
47. See Genetic Screening of Workers: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
103 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Genetic Screening] (testimony of Professor Mark
Rothstein) (genetic monitoring tests do not differentiate along racial and ethnic lines.)
48. See ROLE OF GENETIc TEsTING, supra note 9, at 46.
49. Mutagens and chromosomal aberrations have been identified as causal factors in cancer.
About 90 percent of chemicals known to cause cancer in animals are known to cause mutations
in humans. OFFIcE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETER-
ImUNG CANCER RisKs FROM THE ENVIRoNMENT (1981). Chemicals identified with genetic damage
are many. Research, however, has identified exposures to arsenic, benzene, epichlorohydrin,
ethylene oxide, vinyl, chloride monomer, lead, cadmium, and zinc as causal factors in genetic
damage. See ROLE OF GENEric TESTING, supra note 9, at 71-74.
50. Ionizing radiation is defined by statute as "gamma rays and x-rays; alpha and beta
particles, high speed electrons, neutrons, protons, and other nuclear particles; but not sound
or radio waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §25805(b).
51. See ROLE OF GENETC TESTING, supra note 9, at 46.
52. See Cairns, The Cancer Problem, SC. AM., Nov. 1975, at 64, 67.
53. The body possesses gene products that can prevent promotion of disease. They include
genes for DNA repair, immune function and carcinogen metabolism. If DNA is repaired com-
pletely and genes are restored to their original status, no permanent damage will result. If
mistakes are made in the repair process, mutations can cause the worker to become hyper-
susceptible. The body's immune system can also heal cell mutations. By recognizing them as
"foreign," the body's immune system kills them. A person's carcinogenic metabolism may
also activate complex enzymatic systems and permit a person to ward off disease. See ROLE
OF GENETiC TET nG, supra note 9, at 53.
54. Id.
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ous exposure before cells replicate to prevent damage and restore in-
jured cells to a healthy condition.5"
Persons suffering from genetic aberrations will not necessarily con-
tract disease as a result of the aberrations.16 Although the reason for
this phenomona is not understood, many researchers believe that per-
sons experiencing genetic damage have a heightened susceptibility to
disease. 1 These researchers maintain, however, that persons who do
not themselves contract disease may still produce offspring with
debilitating diseases or deformities.58
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that chromosomal alterations
may cause disease. If monitoring programs were implemented and
genetic changes recognized before disease resulted, steps could be taken
to prevent disease from actually occurring. Presently, statutory law
enabling the administrative implementation of medical surveillance
programs59 does not enumerate criteria that must be satisfied before
a regulation compelling any specific medical testing can be im-
plemented. Other statutes and case law, however, pertaining to the
development of standards for regulating toxic substances, offer some
guidance.
C. Assessing Validity of a Genetic Monitoring Standard
California law provides for the development of standards for
regulating toxic substances. 60 Factors to be considered in developing
55. Some toxic substances actually destroy cells which have the capability to repair
chromosomal aberrations. These chemical carcinogens are immuno-suppressants attacking the
body's immune functions, thereby inhibiting the body's ability to kill diseased cells. See ROLE
OF GEN=TrC TESTIN, supra note 9, at 53.
56. Id. at 59. "The proportion of workers likely to contract a disease depends not only
on . . . variables . . . [off . . . reliability, validity, frequency of the genotype . . . but on
the relative risk for the disease imposed by the genetic trait of damage." Id.
57. See infra note 58.
58. Leaders in the field of occupational health disagree about whether a correlation exists
between genetic damage and susceptibility to disease. See Genetic Screening of Workers: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). No agreement exists among scientists that tests
furnish more than a biological endpoint, the significance of which is unknown at this time.
Id. But see Killian, Use of Human Biological Monitoring for Risk Assessment of Mutagenesis
and Carcinogenic Effect, in I SAFE HANDaLNG OF CEMICAL CARCINOGENS, MUTAOENS,
TERAToGmEs AND Himy Toxic Stmsricas 247, 253-56 (D. Walters ed. 1980) (tests are predictive
of cancer). Some suggestion has been made that industry will be reluctant to acknowledge test
validity because of the potential liability. Severo, Dispute Arises over Dow Studies on Genetic
Damage in Workers, N.Y. Times, Feo. 3, 1980 at Al, col. 1.
59. CAL. LAB. CODE. §142.3(d). see supra note 17.
60. Id. §6300 (Cal-OSHA provides for development and erfoe-ement of effective stan-
dards. See also id. §6360. Chapter 2.5 of C;,I-OSHA, the Hazardous Suosidnce and Training Act,
provides for collection and disseminatioi of information about hazardous substances in the
workplace.
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standards include attainment of the highest degree of health and safety
protection for employees, latest scientific data, reasonableness of the
standards, and experience gained.6' Using the same standards, a pro-
posal to mandate genetic monitoring for certain industries would likely
have to demonstrate that (1) attainment of the highest degree of safety
and health is furthered, (2) the scientific data is sufficiently conclusive
to accurately identify workers who are likely candidates for disease,
and (3) the parameters of the monitoring program are neither too
broad nor too narrow to encompass or exclude workers not likely
to be affected. 2
Of these three criteria, only the second may pose a difficulty for
the administrative agency promulgating regulations. Disagreement exists
within the scientific community about whether the technology is suf-
ficiently developed to predict disease susceptibility accurately. 63
Although no definitive statement has been made to establish that
chromosomal alteration is predictive of a heightened sensitivity to
debilitating diseases, many researchers have identified and reported
a correlation.14 Courts that have considered the validity of standards
based on scientific data have recognized that definitive scientific data
are only infrequently available and that conclusions among research-
ers about the meaning of any study differ more often than they agree.61
Consequently, courts do not demand that agencies promulgating regula-
tions based on scientific or medical data present conclusive results
61. Id. §144.6. Section 144.6 provides:
In promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents,
the board shall adopt the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to a hazard regulated by such standard
for the period of his working life. Development of standards under this section shall
be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information
as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of highest degree of health
and safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available
scientific data in the field, the reasonableness of the standards, and experience gained
under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the standards
promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance
desired.
Id.
62. The only parameters of a genetic monitoring program that will be the subject of this
comment are those pertaining to removing the worker from the hazardous setting and guaranteeing
wages during the removal period. In addition, provisions for data collection will be discussed.
It is the opinion of this author that details such as which industries should be regulated and
which workers within those industries should be tested is best left to the administrative agency
promulgating regulations.
63. See supra note 58.
64. Id.
65. United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied
426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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to support a regulation." Rather, the courts generally will uphold
a regulation if the regulation is based upon "nonconclusive but sug-
gestive" results of numerous studies.67
As a result, even if data about whether genetic changes are predic-
tive of the future likelihood of disease are inconclusive, that uncertainty
generally does not prevent regulation. Once the promulgating agency
has identified numerous studies that establish a correlation between
genetic alteration and disease, the criterion requiring that the regula-
tion further the goal of assuring health and safety is easily satisfied.
Since one of the goals of a genetic monitoring program would be
to identify susceptible workers and eliminate hazardous exposure,
employee health and safety would be ensured.
Many agents, primarily ionizing radiation and certain toxic chemical
substances, are thought to cause genetic alteration.6" These agents have
previously been identified as dangerous in other contexts, 69 and in-
dustries that generate exposures to them are already highly regulated.7"
Regulations to mandate genetic monitoring programs would probably
affect these industries, at least initially. Consequently, a summary of
the scientific information suggesting correlations between disease and
ionizing radiation and certain toxic chemical substances follows.
D. Specific Agents Causing Genetic Alteration
Research to determine effects of chromosomal aberrations resulting
from excessive exposure to ionizing radiation has been conducted.71
Uranium miners, plutonium processing facility workers, and nuclear
power plant workers have all been subjects of studies which
demonstrate that increases in chromosomal aberrations are associated
66. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1253; Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 37-38.
67. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1253; Ethyl Corp. 541 F.2d at 37-38.
68. See RoLE oF GENETIC TESTING, supra note 9, at 67-74.
69. CAL. AmIN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5207(c) provides that the "burning, welding or heating
of cadmium produces poisonous vapor." Id. Vinyl chloride is an agent suspected to cause cancer.
Id. R. 5210(l)(1-5). Exposures to inorganic arsenic may cause lung cancer or irritate skin. Id.
R.5214, App. A, II. Short term lead exposures can cause brain damage, seizures, coma and
even death. Id. R. 5216, App. A, II, B(I). Chronic exposures may damage blood forming
nervous, urinary and reproductive systems. Id. R. 5216, App. A, II B(2). Exposures to benzene
may cause blood deficiencies, vertigo, nausea, leukemia and death. Industrial Union v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 617-20 (1980).
70. CAL. LAB. CODE §§6300-6708.
71. See supra note 50; see also RoI oF GENEnc TFsTING, supra note 9, at 71. Japanese
survivors of World War II have been extensively monitored. Test results "clearly demonstrate
a relationship between estimated radiation dose and certain cancers and between radiation dose
and chromosomal aberrations." For individuals, however, elevated frequencies are not reliable
indicators of cancer risk. Id.
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with ionizing radiation exposure." Disease consequences of exposures
to ionizing radiation have been recognized by California lawmakers. 7"
The Legislature has declared that "the public interest requires that
the people of the state be protected from excessive and improper
exposures."" The Legislature has also recognized that "radioactive
contamination of the environment may subject the people to un-
necessary exposure to ionizing radiation unless it is properly
controlled."7 5 The State Department of Health Services has been em-
powered by statute to initiate and administer necessary programs of
surveillance and control of activities leading to introducing radioac-
tive materials into the environment.76 Workers exposed to concentra-
tions of ionizing radiation known or suspected to exceed a certain
level can be required to undergo medical review.77
Tests to determine the effects of exposure on genetic structure
also have been conducted for the following chemicals: arsenic,
benzene, 71 epichlorohydrin, 80 ethylene oxide, 8 vinyl chloride mon-
72. See Ro. OFGENETICTESTING, supra note 9, at 71. Further research is necessary to deter-
mine whether current occupational standards pose dangers of increased frequency of aberrations.
"From these studies, it is not clear if the chromosomal aberration endpoint is sensitive enough to
detect chronic exposures within the current occupational standard of 5 rems per year." Id.
73. CAL. HEATHx & SAFETY CODE §25600 (programs for surveillance and control of ioniz-
ing radiation in the environment); id. §25660 (standards of education, training and experience
for persons using x-rays).
74. Id. §25660.
75. Id. §25600.
76. Id.
77. See CAL. A=mi. CODE, tit. 17, R. 30277, providing in part:
(a) Each user shall make provisions for a regular bio-assay program where indicated
by and appropriate to the nature of potential exposure.
(b) In cases of known or suspected exposure excluding permissible values, the depart-
ment may require any user to provide for medical examination and where indicated,
treatment, by a qualified physician acceptable to the department.
Id.
78. RoLE oF GENzric TEsTiNG, supra note 9, at 71-72. Arsenic is a human carcinogen,
and elevated numbers of genetic aberrations have been reported in individuals exposed to arsenic.
Only one study has been conducted in an occupational setting and "is not sufficient to permit
a decision on the suitability of cytogenetic endpoints for measuring exposures." Id. See also
CAL. ADmIN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5214 (administrative regulations pertaining to arsenic).
79. See ROLE OF GENETiC TEsTING, supra note 9, at 72. Benzene is a human carcinogen.
Exposures to dosages in excess of 40 parts per million (ppm) have been associated with
chromosomal aberrations in humans. "Whether exposures ... within the current occupational
standard of 10 ppm induce chromosomal aberrations has yet to be determined." Id.
80. Id. EpichIorohydrin is not a human carcinogen, but is "mutagenic in micro-organisms,
causes chromosomal aberrations in mouse bone marrow, and induces chromosomal aberrations
in human lymphocytes in vitro." Id. One study indicates that occupational exposures are
associated with genetic aberrations at "low level frequencies." Id. In another study on
epichlorohydrin, a doubling of chromosome breakage rate was found for workers as compared
with job applicants. Severo, supra note 58, at Al, col. I.
81. RoLE OF GENETIc TEsTING, supra note 9, at 72. Ethylene oxide has been shown to
be associated with chromosomal aberrations. Id. In a study currently underway, "statistically
significant increases in aberrations were seen for exposures ranging from 1-10 ppm." Id. The
current occupational standard is 50 ppm, time weighted average. Id.
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omer,12 lead,13 cadmium, 4 and zinc.8" Research demonstrates that
exposures to these chemical agents may be associated with increas-
ed susceptibility to genetic alterations.8 6 Occupational disease fre-
quency and severity from exposure to many of these chemical agents
has been recognized in the past, and exposed workers are presently
required by administrative regulation to undergo extensive medical
surveillance.87
The scientific data demonstrate that test results generated from a
genetic monitoring program can be indicative of an increased suscep-
tibility to disease. Moreover, the data are sufficiently conclusive that
regulations to mandate genetic monitoring could overcome a legal
challenge. Before genetic monitoring is compelled, however, the ad-
ministrative agency responsible for promulgating regulations must be
convinced that the benefits which can be derived from regulating testing
are significant and that the present method of maintaining employer
discretion either to conduct or refrain from testing fails to protect
workers.88 To amplify the need for genetic monitoring in the workplace,
this comment will next examine the implications for employees if testing
is not governmentally regulated.
I. EMPLOYERS' LEGAL RIGHTS ABSENT
A GENETIC MONITORING MANDATE
Currently, little is known about the extent of genetic monitoring
82. Id. at 73. Vinyl chloride monomer is a human carcinogen, and increases in chromosomal
aberrations are "well documented" for relatively high levels of exposures. Id. The aberrations
disappear over days or weeks. Id. No detectable aberrations are evident when exposure is less
than 5 ppm. CAL. ADmN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5210(c)(1-3). The current California occupational
standard provides that exposure shall not exceed 1 ppm averaged over any 8 hour period. Id.
83. ROLE OF GENETIC TESTnGO, supra note 9, at 72. Lead, cadmium and zinc exposures
occur together in occupational settings. Studies about the effects these substances have on
chromosomes are inconsistent, with some finding increased frequencies of aberrations. Id. See
also CAL. Arm. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5216.
84. See ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING, supra note 9, at 72; see also CAL. ADMN. CODE, tit.
8, R. 5207.
85. See ROLE OF GENETIc TESTING, supra note 9, at 72.
86. See supra notes 78-85.
87. Medical surveillance for employees exposed to vinyl chloride includes medical history,
and blood tests. CAL. ADamN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5210(k)(1)(A-B). Tests are to be repeated every
six months for employees exposed to vinyl chloride ten years or longer, and annually for all
other employees. Id. R. 5210(k)(2)(A-B). Medical surveillance for employees exposed to in-
organic arsenic include comprehensive medical history, physical examination, chest x-rays, blood
count, urinalysis, and sputum cytology test. Id. R. 5214(n)(2)(A-E). Tests are to be repeated
annually for employees under 45 years of age who have had less than ten years exposure,
and semi-annually for employees who are either over 45 years of age or have had more than
ten years of exposure. Id. R. 5214(n)(3)(A-B). Extensive regulations provide for medical ex-
aminations for employees exposed to lead. See id. R. 52160)(1-4).
88. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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being conducted in the workplace.8 9 A study" commissioned by the
United States Office of Technology Assistance9" in 1982 to determine
the extent of genetic testing 2 in industry suggests that only a minimal
amount of testing is presently being performed. Of those responding
to the survey, only slightly more than one percent answered that they
were presently conducting genetic tests, and slightly more than four
percent indicated that tests have been used in the past. 93 More than
sixteen percent, however, responded that they would probably use tests
in the next five years.9" The results of the survey suggest that although
little testing is being performed now, a significant increase in genetic
testing can be anticipated. 95
In the absence of any formalized mandate requiring that certain
employers conduct genetic monitoring, employers presently have the
option to include or exclude genetic monitoring in any medical
surveillance program. If industries that pose dangers to workers would
(1) elect to incorporate genetic testing into their medical surveillance
programs, (2) disclose to employees that the testing is to be under-
taken, and (3) develop a program to remove employees suffering
genetic damage from the dangerous environment, few problems would
emerge within a voluntary program. Conversely, if (1) industry opted
not to perform testing, or (2) implemented an inadequate program,
an employee could be adversely affected if the employee were ter-
89. Goodrich, supra note 12, at 27 (names of companies using genetic screening unknown);
Severo, supra note 27, at Al, col. 1 (extent of genetic screening remains a matter of specula-
tion); ROLE OF GENETic TESTING, supra note 9, at 33 (conflicting accounts of extent of testing
and use of results); Hearings on Genetic Screening, supra note 47, at 103 (widely believed that
many employers use genetic screening or monitoring testing methods).
90. The 561 groups surveyed included the 500 largest United States industries, chief ex-
ecutive officers of the 50 largest private utility companies, and the presidents of 11 major unions.
Three hundred sixty-six of those sent questionnaires submitted responses. See ROLE OF GENETIc
TESING, supra note 9, at 175.
91. The study was conducted between February and June, 1982, by the National Opinion
Research Center, a non-profit survey corporation affiliated with the University of Chicago.
Id. See also id. at 175-213 for details regarding design, methodology, and a draft report of
the survey results.
92. The questionnaire did not initially differentiate between genetic screening and genetic
monitoring, inquiring only if genetic testing was performed. In a later question, information
was collected about the types of testing conducted. Id. at 35. Table 4 provides information
on the "frequency of current, past and/or future use of genetic testing by type" and lists
17 companies as admitting to giving genetic screening tests and eight companies are listed as
acknowledging that they conduct genetic monitoring program. Id.
93. Id. at 35. Table 3 provides the distribution of organizations by type, indicating cur-
rent, past, and/or future use of genetic testing. Of the 366 respondents, 1.6 percent indicated
that testing was presently being performed and 4.6 percent acknowledged that testing had been
performed in the past. Id.
94. Id. The number of respondents indicating that they would probably test in the future
was 16.1 percent. Id.
95. Id.
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minated, transferred to a lower paying position, or suffered serious
health impairment. A program would be inadequate if it either failed
to include provisions for disclosure to employees that testing was be-
ing performed or did not establish provisions for removal.
A. Consequences if Testing is Not Performed
In the absence of a governmental mandate for genetic testing,
employers are not likely to implement voluntary genetic testing pro-
grams because of a fear of increased costs and increased risks of
liability. 96 By failing to implement voluntary programs, employers will
preclude many injured employees from obtaining recovery under
workers' compensation statutes. Under workers' compensation statutes,
an employee who contracts disease must establish a causal relation-
ship between the work environment and the disease before recovery
is available.97 Cancer susceptibility due to chromosomal changes can
be identified through a genetic monitoring program. 98 With limited
exceptions,99 workers' compensation'00 is the exclusive remedy under
California law' for an employee who suffers occupationally induced
disease.' 2 As a consequence, employers who fail to provide genetic
monitoring programs may prevent an employee's recovery authorized
by law.
If testing is not performed, a worker who contracts cancer will be
faced with the almost insurmountable task of establishing a causal
connection between the occupation and the cancer. 1 3 Demonstration
of the requisite causal relationship is extremely difficult because of
96. See Note, Occupationally Induced Cancer Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HA~v.
L. REv. 697, 701-05 (1983). The author maintains that genetic monitoring should be compelled
and recommends a federal scheme for medical removal and screening.
97. 2 W. HANNA, CAL. LAW OF EMaPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§11.02[l] (2nd Ed. 1983); See Walter v. Industrial Accident Commission, 209 Cal. 635, 638
P. 627, 628 (1930). Decedent's widow was denied coverage under workers' compensation statutes.
Widow was unable to establish causal connection between the disease which caused the death
and the injury which resulted from the accident.
98. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
99. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(b) (exceptions to exclusive remedy provisions of workers' com-
pensation law.)
100. Id. §§3200-6208.
101. Id. §3602.
102. Id. §3208. Disease arising from employment is an injury within workers' compensa-
tion statutes. The California Supreme Court has determined that the inclusion of disease within
the term injury is authorized by the California Constitution. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 215 Cal. 461, 462-64, 11 P.2d 1, 2-3 (1932).
103. W. HANNA, supra note 97, at §11.03[5][h]; see also San Francisco v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission, 183 Cal. 273, 275-83, 191 P. 26, 27-30 (1920) (discussion of causal connec-
tion between illness and employment); Engels Copper Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, 183 Cal. 714, 71.5, 192 P. 845, 846 (1920).
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the long latency period of cancer. 104 If this relationship is not estab-
lished, the worker will be denied benefits. 0 5 Whether the disease results
from the employment is a question of fact, 106 and no presumption
arises that disease occurring in the course of employment arose out
of the employment. 107 For a worker to recover, that worker must show
that the disease was proximately caused by the hazardous conditions
of the employment. 08 Thus, a worker who does not have the benefit
of a genetic monitoring program could also suffer the detrimental
effect of not recovering under workers' compensation even though
workplace exposures would be the cause of the harm.
Recovery under workers' compensation for occupationally induced
cancer is rare because no data are availale to demonstrate that disease
is an outcome of employment, and traditionally, little is known about
the causes of cancer. 09 If employers were compelled to conduct genetic
monitoring tests, medical evidence of increased susceptibility to disease
would be available to diseased workers." 0 This medical evidence then
could be used to support a claim that cancer was occupationally
induced."' In addition, the Legislature may respond favorably to an
effort by workers to secure the passage of legislation that would ease
the worker's burden of proof in workers' compensation proceedings
to recover for occupationally induced cancer. Since medical data show-
ing a claimant's chromosomal structure would be available, a statute
providing for a rebuttable presumption that cancer which developed
during employment was occupationally induced could be enacted." 12
Female employees in particular can be negatively affected by an
employer's decision not to monitor genetically. Under court decisions," 3
104. See W. HANNA, supra note 97, at §11.03[5][h].
105. Id.
106. Engles Copper, 183 Cal. at 715, 192 P. at 846.
107. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 140 Cal.
App. 482, 486, 35 P.2d 366, 368 (1934).
108. CAL. LAB. CODE §3212.1. In the case of publicly employed firefighters, a rebuttable
presumption exists that cancer that develops during active service is industrially caused. Id.
A firefighter must demonstrate that there was exposure to a known carcinogen and that the
carcinogen was reasonably linked to the disease. Id.
109. See W. HANNA, supra note 97, at §11.0315][h].
110. CAL. Cir. CODE, §§56-56.37. (Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.)
111. Id. §56.20(c)(2). That section provides for the disclosure of pertinent parts of the
employee's medical information retained by the employer "which is relevant in a lawsuit ar-
bitration, grievance, or other claim or challenge to which the employer and employee are par-
ties and in which the patient has placed in issue his or her medical history, mental or physical
condition, or treatment." Id.
112. See supra note 108. Provisions protecting workers exposed to toxic substances in the
workplace could be enacted similar to the provisions protecting firefighters. Id..
113. Title VII lawsuits brought by women employees have not yielded positive rulings for
women. See LowN, Women Workers Bring 'Fetal Vulnerability' Suits, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 24,
1983, at A3, col. 1.
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employers have the prerogative to prohibit women of childbearing
age from working in certain toxic work places," ' even though the
genetic structure of the male is also affected by exposure to identical
agents." 5 Courts have accepted employer arguments that liability to
a child born with birth defects or cancer justifies the exclusion." 6
If women of childbearing age were routinely monitored for
chromosomal changes, the need to exclude them totally from the
workplace may diminish." 7
Although voluntary implementation of genetic monitoring is
preferable to no monitoring at all, problems for employees are not
eradicated by voluntary programs. Unless a testing program is per-
formed with full disclosure to employees and provides a comprehen-
sive scheme for the removal of the worker and salary retention follow-
ing discovery that a worker has contracted genetic damage, employees
are not sufficiently protected. To illustrate the potential dangers of
voluntary programs, which fall to provide for full disclosure or lack
provisions for removal, the avenues for recourse available to an
employee harmed as a result of a voluntary program are next
presented.
B. Worker Recourse When Testing is Performed
Even if an employer elects to conduct testing, no assurance exists
114. See generally Comment, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65
CAurF. L. R-v. 1113, 1113-14 (1977) (outright exclusion of women based on assumption that
exposures in the toxic workplace threaten reproductive health of women more than men not
supportable); Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices in Hazardous Industries: Protection
or Discrimination, 5 CoLuM. J. EtvTL. L. 97, 98-102 (1978) (goal of providing safe and healthful
working conditions conflicts with goal of providing equal employment opportunities, and before
women are excluded from the workplace, employer must show that workplace cannot be made
safe and that no other alternative exists). See also Genetic Screening and the Handling of High
Risk Groups in the Workplace: Hearings Before the House of Representatives Committee on
Science and Technology, Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
173-219 (1981) (Testimony of Joan Bertin, Esq., Women's Rights Project, ACLU) (hereinafter
cited as Bertin Testimony) (100,000 jobs closed to women because of exclusionary practices);
Severo, Should Firms Screen the Workplace or the Worker?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1980, at
E22, col. 1 (changing the worker, i.e. excluding women, rather than making the workplace
safe for all, discriminatory); Bayer, Banning Women from the Workplace, L.A. Times, Nov.
25, 1982, at II 7, col. 3 (American Cyanamid, DuPont, General Motors, B.F. Goodrich, Allied
Chemical, Monsanto, Gulf Oil, and Union Carbide are among companies that have exclusionary
practices against women).
115. Bertin Testimony, supra note 114, at 189, 191 (lead exposure affects male and female
reproductive system; spermatogonia sensitive to low-level ionizing radiation; carbon disulfide
and vinyl chloride damage sperm cells; dibromo-chloropropane causes male sterility); see also
United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (occupa-
tional lead exposures harm men as well as women according to OSHA); supra note 114.
116. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
117. See Comment, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, supra note
114, at 137-39.
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that the testing will be performed for the benefit of the employee.
For instance, tests could be performed without worker knowledge.' s
Workers could suffer genetic alterations and remain uninformed of
the changes to their genetic structure.119 Without disclosure, employers
unwilling to assume the financial obligations that might arise if workers
identified as susceptible were informed of alterations to their genetic
structure would not be confronted by workers' compensation claims. 10
Another danger of a voluntary program is that no assurance exists
that test results will be properly utilized.' If employers do not perceive
a threat of liability because of the potential for future development
of cancer, a tendency to underutilize tests and retain endangered
workers in the workplace could result.122 Alternatively, employers who
fear liability might overutilize tests and exclude large numbers of
workers from the workplace.2 3
Workers subjected to an employer's arbitrary utilization of testing
pursuant to a voluntary program may seek recovery from an employer
if disease is contracted or termination is a consequence of test results.
In the absence of a statutory mandate for genetic monitoring, a worker
could only seek redress for harm under an existing statute or the com-
mon law. As will be demonstrated first, common law remedies are
effectively closed to an injured employee.
Common Law
At common law, every employer owed three duties to employees:
118. See Severo, The Genetic Barrier: Job Benefit or Job Bias?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3-6,
1980, at Al, col. 1. The four-part series has been identified as the catalyst for much of the
interest that has surrounded genetic testing. Goodrich, supra note 12, at 27. The Severo articles
spurred states to adopt legislation prohibiting discrimination based on genetic screening results,
and was "significant" impetus for congressional hearings, and survey. See also Severo, supra
note 27, at A36, col 1. Severo reported that a Dow Chemical Company geneticist wanted to
inform workers of test results, but Dow refused contending that "data were hard to evaluate
and it would not have been responsible to alarm workers by citing data that might be inac-
curate." Severo, supra note 58, at B10, col. 1. Another Dow Chemical geneticist wanted Dow
to adopt a company policy providing that genetically damaged workers be transferred and notified.
Id. No policy was formulated. Id.
119. See supra note 118.
120. Severo, supra note 58, at Al, col. 1. A former Dow consultant stated, "[F]rom a
moral and legal standpoint, industry should be held ... liable for having the procedures and
not using them to protect workers." Severo, supra note 27, at Al, col. 1. A former Dow
geneticist said, "[Wihen we found people who have . . . [experienced genetic alternations] .
. . we should not just move them out and replace them with fresh workers. We should go
in and clean up the workplace so that anybody can work there." Id.
121. Note, Occupationally Induced Cancer Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HAv.
L. Ray. 697, 701-05 (1983). The author maintains that genetic monitoring should be compelled
and recommends that a federal scheme for medical screening and removal be devised. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 703.
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first, to provide suitable tools to perform job functions; second, to
use care in selection of co-employees; and finally, to provide a
reasonably safe place to perform job tasks. 2 4 A breach of any of
these duties gave rise to a cause of action by an employee. 2 ' These
common-law obligations were modified by workers' compensation
statutes '2 6 which are now the exclusive remedy 27 for job related
injuries. 28 Today, a common-law right of action against an employer
arises only if a specifically enumerated exception to the exclusive
remedy provision of the workers' compensation statute can be
invoked. 129
One recognized exception, fraudulent concealment by an employer
of a job related injury when that concealment results in aggravation
of the injury,"' may be available if the employer failed to advise
the worker of the condition. 3' Under this exception, the employer
may be held liable for the employee's injuries if an employee could
show that (1) genetic monitoring had been performed, (2) tests util-
ized were predictive of disease susceptibility, (3) the employee's test
results were indicative of increased susceptibility, (4) the employee
was not informed about his condition, and (5) disease was contracted
as a result of continued exposure. 3 2 Although an employee par-
ticipating in a genetic monitoring program could conceivably over-
come this burden, the likelihood is minimal. The fraudulent conceal-
ment exception was recognized by the California Supreme Court in
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court.'33
In Johns-Manville, the plaintiff sued his employer in tort after he
developed asbestos-related illnesses that were established to have been
caused by the employment. 34 The plaintiff alleged that the employer
fraudulently concealed the fact that plaintiff was suffering from disease
from him, from the physicians retained to treat him, and from the
state to whom the employer was obligated to report incidents of oc-
cupationally induced disease.1 35 In addition, the court noted that the
124. Donnelly v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 117 Cal. 417, 423, 49 P. 559, 561 (1897).
125. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. §3602(b). See generally Review of Selected 1982 California Legislation, 14 PAC.
L.J. 763-65 (1983) (exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision).
130. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 476,
612 P.2d 948, 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 866 (1980); CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(b)(2).
131. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602.
132. See RoLE oF GENETic TEsTrNG, supra note 9, at 114.
133. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
134. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
135. Id. at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
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employer was aware of the health dangers of asbestos exposure, failed
to provide the employee with adequate safety equipment, and did not
operate its facility consistent with state and federal regulations. 3 6 Find-
ing that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for fraudulent con-
cealment, the court distinguished between negligent and intentional
acts of the employer,"3 7 affirming that the negligent acts of an employer
may not provide for an action at law against the employer.'38 Although
results of genetic monitoring programs are recognized by some scien-
tists as indicative of disease susceptibility,13 9 a court probably would
not construe the employer's failure to advise the employee of test
results as intentional if the employer were engaged in a voluntary pro-
gram. Absent recognition by the Legislature that genetic monitoring
programs can reduce incidence of disease, a court would find the
employer's conduct to be only negligent, and thereby preclude plain-
tiff recovery in an action for fraudulent concealment.
Although California law specifically limits exceptions to the exclusive
remedy provisions to those enumerated by statute,' 0 an employee could
also recommend creation of a judicial exception by arguing that
damages be awarded for willful and intentional acts of the employer
if the worker were not removed from the site of the dangerous ex-
posure. Other states have responded favorably to proof demonstrating
that the employer's willful and intentional act caused the worker
harm.'' This approach, however, is not likely to receive a favorable
response in a California court. The California Legislature has enacted
statutes providing that an employee may collect an additional fifty
percent above the applicable workers' compensation benefits if the
injury results from the serious and willful misconduct of the
employer.' 2 In Johns-Manville,143 the plaintiff also sought to recover
in an action at law for the "intentional" acts of the employer to
conceal information about his disease.14 The California Supreme Court
held that the statutory fifty percent additional benefit was the ex-
136. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
137. Id. at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
138. Id.
139. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
140. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602.
141. Mandolidas v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978). The West
Virginia Supreme Court held that an employer could be held liable in tort for willful, wanton,
or reckless misconduct. Id.
142. CAL. LAB. CODiE §4553. See generally Review of Selected 1982 California Legislation,
14 PAC. L.J. 768.
143. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980); see supra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text (for discussion of other aspects of the case).
144. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at 470, 612 P.2d at 951, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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clusive remedy available to the plaintiff for the employer's "inten-
tional" acts."45 The court concluded that the statutory provisions were
intended to penalize the "intentional" acts, 4 6 even though the statute
utilized "serious and willful" terminology." 7 An action at law by a
California employee for an employer's willful and intentional miscon-
duct, therefore, would probably fail.
While technically the common law is a mechanism by which an
injured worker could recover, the foregoing has demonstrated that
in practicality, the common law is not a viable solution for the long-
term problems generated by optional genetic monitoring programs.
By limiting the exceptions to workers' compensation to only those
specifically enumerated, the Legislature has limited the ability of the
judiciary to create new exceptions to workers' compensation. Other
statutory provisions,'4 8 such as the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act or collective bargaining statutes, however, arguably may
offer solutions to the injured worker.
California Fair Employment and Housing Act
The California Fair Employment and Housing Act, 49 which pro-
hibits job discrimination on specified grounds such as race '1 0 and
handicap,' is one statutory provision that may provide grounds for
redress to a worker terminated because of genetic structure. An
employee's claim based on allegations of racial discrimination, however,
probably would not succeed if termination resulted from genetic
monitoring test results. Since chromosomal aberrations do not ap-
pear to differentiate along racial lines," 2 the employee would be unable
to show discriminatory intent, a necessary element for recovery.5 3
A discrimination claim, thus, would be applicable to genetic screen-
ing programs only. 54
145. Id. at 474-75, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863-64.
146. Id. at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
147. Id. at 471, 612 P.2d at 951, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
148. Since this comment recommends that California institute a genetic monitoring pro-
gram, the focus of the following discussion will be on applicable California statutory provi-
sions. See infra notes 149-73, and accompanying text. Pertinent federal statutes will be iden-
tified but not discussed.
149. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§12900-12996; see also 29 U.S.C. §§701-94. The Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 applies only to federal contractors and recipients of federal funds, and prohibits
discrimination based on handicap. Id. See ROLE OF GENEnc TEsINr, supra note 9, at 126
(for a general discussion of its applicability to a genetic testing program).
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§12921, 12940.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 44.
154. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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The handicap provisions' of the Act, however, may offer a remedy
to the terminated worker as a result of a genetic monitoring pro-
gram. No specific determination has been made that an aberrant genetic
structure constitutes a handicap. The California Supreme Court,
however, broadly interpreted the term "handicap' 5 6 in American Na-
tional Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n.1 7 In
American National Ins., the court ruled that high blood pressure con-
stituted a handicap.' In discussing the provision of the Act providing
that an employer may not discriminate based on any "health impair-
ment related or associated with a diagnosis of cancer for which a
person has been rehabilitated or cured,"' 59 the court left open the
question of whether that definition implied that an "unrehabilited
cancer patient is never physically handicapped."' 6
Although a diagnosis of damaged chromosomes does not mean that
a worker will contract cancer, the worker should be removed from
the site of the exposure.' 6' Thus, if the court were to define handicap
as the "loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the normal
life of the community on an equal level with others,"' 62 genetic damage
could constitute a handicap and provide a basis for recovery to an
injured worker. In the face of the persuasive dissent of Justice Mosk,'"6
however, little assurance exists that the court would conclude that an
aberrant genetic structure would constitute a handicap. Justice Mosk
argued that the majority's "sweeping definition violates a number of
canons of statutory construction"' 64 and "more important, [the opin-
ion] ignores the legislative intent apparent from viewing the statute
as a whole and in the light of the rest of the legislation of which
it is an integral and inseparable part.' '1 6 While a worker possibly
could obtain redress for injuries Under the California Fair Employ-
ment arid Housing Act, the worker's reliance on the court to inter-
pret aberrant genetic structure as a handicap would be misplaced. Col-
lective bargaining statutes are another avenue of potential recovery
for an injured or terminated worker, but only if a genetic monitoring
155. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§12921, 12940.
156. American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm., 32 Cal. 3d 603,
610, 651 P.2d 1151, 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350 (1982).
157. Id. at 610, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
158. Id.
159. Id.; CAL. GoV'T CODE §12926(f).
160. 32 Cal. 3d at 610, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
161. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
162. 32 Cal. 3d at 609 n.5, 651 P.2d at 1155 n.5, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349 n.5.
163. Id. at 611, 651 P.2d at 1156, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 350 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 612, 651 P.2d at 1157, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 351 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
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program is part of a bargaining agreement between the employer and
employees.
Collective Bargaining Statutes
A worker terminated because of genetic structure may also have
an action against the employer based on the provisions of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that has been negotiated between workers
and the employer. Under the California collective bargaining statutes,1"
employers and employees may bargain for rights and duties that ex-
ceed boundaries of statutory provisions. 167 Areas subject to collective
bargaining include worker safety and health.16 For instance, employees
could negotiate to require that an employer provide a genetic monitor-
ing program and remove the worker from the hazardous environment
if an increased susceptibility to disease is identified. Even though
statutory law may not require that the employer grant these considera-
tions for the employee, the provisions, if agreed upon, would be en-
forced by a court as part of the collective bargaining agreement. 6 9
Thus, if an employee could demonstrate that (1) termination resulted
because test results suggested an increased susceptibility to disease and
(2) the employer's action was inconsistent with the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement, the employee would have statutory
recourse to regain prior employment status.
Generally, disputes based on collective bargaining provisions are
resolved through arbitration.1 71 When the physical disability of the
employee results in termination, the worker usually will be reinstated
pursuant to an arbitration decision unless the disability poses a serious'
risk of injury to the disabled worker or other workers, or prevents
the worker from performing job functions.17' While collective bargaiii-
ing may appear to be a positive mechanism for the implementation
of a genetic monitoring program without the interference of govern-
ment, employees probably would not consider a genetic monitoring
program a high priority'72 because employees tend to focus their
166. CAL. LAB. CODE §1126; see also 29 U.S.C. §§151-168 (National Labor Relations Act).
See generally ROLE OF GENEic TEsTiNG, supra note 9, at 131-33 (for a discussion of implica-
tions of collective bargaining agreements on genetic monitoring programs). Only about 20 per-
cent of workers are unionized, however, and thereby are able to utilize collective bargaining.
See Hearings on Genetic Screening, supra note 47, at 104.
167. CAL. LAB. CODE §1126.
168. See ROLE OF GENETIC TEsTnNG, supra note 9, at 131.
169. CAL. LAB. CODE §1126.
170. See RoLE OF GENETc TEsTNo, supra note 9, at 133.
171. Wolkinson, Arbitration and Employment Rights of the Physically Disadvantaged, 36
ARBrrRATION J., 23-24 (June, 1981).
172. See H. DAvEY, M. BOONANNO, D. EDELsrEiN, CONTEMPORARY CoL EcrrvE BARoAiN-
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bargaining efforts on wages and job security.1 73
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a voluntary program
cannot adequately address the interests of employees. An alternative
is the implementation of a mandatory genetic monitoring program.
Cal-OSHA was enacted to assure the elimination of hazards in the
workplace.' 7 That body of law, therefore, is the likely source from
which a compelled program would emanate. The pertinent provisions
of Cal-OSHA that suggest administrative regulations could be pro-
mulgated to implement a compelled monitoring program will next be
described. The need to include removal and wage guarantee pro-
visions within a compelled program will also be discussed.
III. REGULATION To MANDATE GENETIC MoNIToRIG: A PROPOSAL
A mandated genetic monitoring program must encompass four
critical provisions if the program is to offer protection for workers.
Present mandatory medical surveillance programs are only mandatory
in one sense: the employer must provide them. The employee, however,
is not required to participate in medical surveillance programs.' 75 If
a genetic monitoring program is to be enacted, the program must
offer the worker incentives to assure that workers will participate.
Consequently, a mandatory genetic monitoring program should in-
clude: (1) a requirement that employers fully disclose information about
testing being performed and the results of the tests; (2) procedures
for removal of the worker from the site of hazardous exposure when
test results identify disease susceptibility; (3) a system assuring salary,
and seniority retention during the removal period; and (4) a require-
ment that statistical data compiled from the test results be submit-
ted to an appropriate governmental agency. The appropriate agency
to promulgate the regulations is the Occupational Safety and Health
Standards Board.
mo 6 (1982). Collective bargaining covers two major subject areas: (1) price of labor including
wages, pension and life insurance programs, and vacations, and (2) a system of industrial
jurisprudence including policies and procedures governing on the job relations. Id. at 6.
173. See U.S. DEPARTmENT OF LABOR, BuREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF
MAJOR CoLaEcTIvE BARGAINNG AGREEmENTS, JANUARY 1, 1980 at 38, 59, 78, 96, 101, 111 (Bull.
2095, 1981). Publications describe current trends in collective bargaining. Id. at 1. Bargaining
agreements tend to include provisions for wages, id. at 38, hours and overtime, id. at 59,
paid and unpaid leave, id. at 78, seniority, id. at 96, job security, id. at 101, grievance settle-
ment, id. at 111. By its absence, this author has concluded that provisions pertaining to medical
surveillance do not have a high priority in collective bargaining.
174. CAL. LAB. CODE §6300; see Comment, The California Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1973, 9 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 905, 919-37 (for a general overview of CaI-OSHA); see
also 29 U.S.C. §§651-78 (OSHA). OSHA was enacted to "assure so far as possible every work-
ing man and women in the nation safe and healthful working conditions." Id. §651.
175. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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A. The California Occupational Safety and Health Act
Cal-OSHA'76 was initially adopted to assure "safe and healthful
working conditions" for all California residents. Statutes other than
Cal-OSHA also reflect the intention of the Legislature to reduce
occupational'77 and genetic disease; 17 however, the provisions of Cal-
OSHA are the most comprehensive of the legislative enactments ex-
pressing an intention to improve the safety and health of workers. 17 9
The California Supreme Court' has ruled that the Act is to be in-
terpreted liberally for the purpose of achieving a safe working
environment."'8  The Division of Occupational Safety and Health, 12
within the Department of Industrial Relations,' is the agency vested
with the authority to enforce and administer the provisions of the
Act requiring a safe working environment and protection of employee
health and safety. "
To implement the general statutory purpose of Cal-OSHA, the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Standards Board "' is empowered to pro-
pose regulations that will safeguard employee health and safety. "
The authority of the Board extends to the enactment of medical
surveillance programs,' 87 which the Board has required for some
exposures. "8 If medical examinations are required by the Board,
176. CAL. LAB. CODE §6300.
177. CAL. HEALr & SAariy CODE §429.11; see supra note 1, for specific provisions of the
statute.
178. CAL. HIAL & SAFETY CODE §309. The state policy of California is to make "every
effort to detect, as early as possible, preventible, heritable disorders leading to mental retarda-
tion or physical defects." Id.
179. Federal OSHA rules are not applicable in California because the state has adopted
its own standards. 29 U.S.C. §667. The state may also adopt standards more stringent than
those mandated by the federal program. Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Appeals Board, 120 Cal. App. 3d 663, 671, 174 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (1981).
180. Bendix Forest Prod. Corp. v. Division of Occupational Safety and Health, 25 Cal.
3d 465, 600 P.2d 1339, 158 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1979).
181. Id. at 470, 600 P.2d at 1342, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
182. CAL. LAB. CODE §6302(d) (definition of division).
183. Id. §6302(b) (definition of .department).
184. Id. §6307.
185. See id. §142.4 (procedures to be followed in adopting regulations).
186. Id. §6308(a), (c). The division can also "require the performance of any other act
which the protection of the health and safety of employees in employments and places of employ-
ment reasonably demands." Id. §6308(c). See also id. §142.2. Occupational Safety and Health
Standards Board authorized to propose and promulgate new or revised orders or standards
or other items concerning safety and health.
187. Id. §142.3(d).
188. CAL. ADzm. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5208G)(1-2) (asbestos); id. R. 5210(k)(1-4) (vinyl chloride);
id. R. 5212(m)(1-6) (dibromo-3-chloropropane); id. R. 5213(n)(1-6) (acryonolite); id. R. 5214(n)(1-5)
(arsenic); id. R. 52160)(1-3) (lead); see also Hearings on Genetic Screening, supra note 47,
at 104. Periodic medical examinations are given to 33.71 percent of all employees. Id. at 104.
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employers are obligated to pay the costs. 189 In developing standards
for medical examinations, the Board probably is not required to con-
duct a cost-benefit analysis when a health related regulation is issued.
While California courts have not definitively stated that a cost-benefit
analysis is not necessary, the United States Supreme Court did so
when analyzing similar provisions contained in the federal OSHA.
In American Textile Manufacturers Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 90 the Court
noted that,
[Congress specifically chose in §655(b)(5) to impose separate and
additional requirements for issuance of a subcategory of occupational
safety and health standards dealing with toxic materials and harm-
ful physical agents; it required that those standards be issued to pre-
vent material impairment to health to the extent feasible. Congress
could reasonably have concluded that health standards should be
subject to different criteria than safety standards... 91
Concluding that a cost benefit analysis was not required for health
standards, the Court determined that Congress, in defining the rela-
tionship between costs and benefits, had placed worker health above
all other considerations.' 92 The standards will be set aside only if "other
considerations" render impossible the achievement of the health goal.' 93
Accordingly, the authority to enact a genetic monitoring program
designed to assure the continued health of workers is vested in the
Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board. In promulgating
regulations, the Board should give priority to the inclusion of provi-
sions of a genetic monitoring program which provide for employer
disclosure, medical removal when disease susceptibility is encountered,
and wage and benefit retention during the removal period.
B. Provisions Encouraging Employee Participation
The incorporation of provisions demanding disclosure by employers
and providing for salary retention and removal'94 should be included
to assure that an enacted program serves the interests of both employers
and employees. Absent full disclosure and removal provisions, con-
189. CAL. HEALTH & SAEY CODE §142.3(d).
190. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). In interpreting the language of section 6(b)(5) of OSHA, which
is similar to the language of section 6401 of the California Labor Code, the Court held the
occupational exposure limits for cotton dust valid. Id. at 541. In Donovan, the Court did pay
special heed to language in section 6(b)(5) providing that the standard should "to the extent
feasible" assure no impairment of health. Id. at 506-22. Section 6401 of the California Labor
Code does not include the feasibility language.
191. Donovan at 512.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 509.
194. See infra notes 197-216 and accompanying text.
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flicts between the interests of employers and employees could arise.
Employers may believe that susceptible workers can be removed from
the workforce to limit liability and maximize profit. Employees who
participate may believe that despite test results, they may elect to
remain in the toxic work environment. If the legislative goals articulated
under Cal-OSHA are to be effected, a compromise must be achieved:
full disclosure coupled with medical removal and wage guarantee is
the ideal method.
Full disclosure provisions are essential to the program, primarily
because the implementation of a mandatory program for all affected
employees is unlikely. All existing medical surveillance programs are
optional to the employee,' 9 perhaps because administrative agencies
promulgating regulations believe that mandatory programs would in-
terfere with the workers' constitutionally protected privacy interests. 196
A genetic monitoring program compelling employee participation is
unnecessary so long as other incentives* that would encourage par-
ticipation are included in the regulations. A medical removal and wage
guarantee program provides the proper incentive.
A statutory medical removal and wage guarantee program is ideal
to achieve a balance between the interests of employers and employees.
Models for removal and wage guarantees have been implemented for
workers experiencing the consequences of excessive exposure to vinyl
chloride,197 lead, 98 and asbestos. 99 The program implemented for lead
exposure, the most comprehensive of the removal and wage guarantee
programs, provides that when an employee becomes eligible for
removal, the employer may transfer the employee to another job or
location, reduce hours, or lay the employee off.20 0 The employer is
obligated, nonetheless, to maintain the employee's earnings, senior-
ity, and provide "other employment rights and benefits ... as though
the employee had not been removed ..."I" for up to eighteen months.
195. See CAL. ADmN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5208, 5210, 5212-14, 5216.
196. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The interest of the government
in securing health for its citizens cannot interfere with the individual's constitutionally pro-
tected privacy interest. The "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions" is constitutionally protected. Id. at 599-600.
197. CAL. AbNam. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5210(k)(5) (provides for medical removal but not wage
guarantees).
198. Id. R. 5216(k)(1-2). Medical removal required until blood level is acceptable; salary
retention, seniority, and benefits may be retained for up to 18 months. Id. R. 5216(k)(3),
5216(k)(6)(A-F).
199. Id. R. 5208(d)(4). Medical removal is required if respirators are ineffective; and pro-
vides for wage retention only if an alternative position is available. Id.
200. Id. R. 5216(k)(5).
201. Id. R. 5216(k)(6)(B).
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The employee is returned to the original employment assignment when
disease symptoms return to a certain level.202
In addition to providing employees with an incentive to participate in
a genetic monitoring program, a medical removal and wage guarantee
program balances the interests of workers and employers, placing the
financial responsibility for worker health on the employer. The
employer's legitimate interest in reducing liability and increasing pro-
fit margins arguably is not protected by removal and wage guarantee
provisions. These interests, nevertheless, should not predominate when
employee health and safety is the alternative. 20 3 Employers have tradi-
tionally been financially responsible for the diseases and injuries in-
curred by workers as a result of the work environment 2 ' and for
the costs of rehabilitating injured workers.20 5 In placing these finan-
cial obligations on the employer, the Legislature has recognized that
costs will be shifted to consumers 06 and reflected in the price of
goods.201
Accordingly, employees would not be completely protected by a
medical removal and wage retention program. For the employee who
has sustained permanent genetic damage, the employer's obligations
cannot be expected to continue indefinitely. Since an employee's in-
terest in working is not a fundamentally protected interest, 2 0  the
employee should not be accorded the option of continuing his ex-
posure in a dangerous setting. Permitting the employee to elect to
continue exposure would interfere with a program goal of health
202. Id. R. 5216(k)(5)(B), 5216(k)(6).
203. See CAL. HEaTH & SAFrTY CODE §429.11 (provisions of that section are cited supra
at note 1); see also supra note 1 (purpose of the Cal-OSHA).
204. See supra notes 97-109 and 124-42 and accompanying text.
205. CAL. LAB. CODE §139.5; see I. SANcHEZ, G. MORRis, J. MnILER, M. EDELSTEIN, THE
CArLoIORA VoRxS' COMwENSATiON REHABiLIrAToN SYsTEM 130-77 (1981) (overview of the
California workers' compensation rehabilitation system).
206. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTs 53-54 (1970).
207. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976).
208. Under equal protection analysis, classifications restricting employment opportunities
are only entitled to minimum level of scrutiny. Mass Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
306, 313-14 (1976). But see Sailer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 539,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971). Although the right to work is not a fundamental right, the
California Supreme Court has recognized that the right to work and "concomitant opportunity
to achieve economic stability are essential to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness . . .
and that this right . . . is of the very essence of personal freedom and opportunity that it
was the purpose of the (Fourteenth) Amendment to secure." Id. at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95
Cal. Rptr. at 339. Although this entitlement could arguably support a worker's contention that
a right exists to elect to remain in a dangerous work setting, if the alternative to continued
exposure is job termination. Employee election should not prevail, however, because permitting
the employee to consent to disease risks defeats the goal of disease reduction. An additional
consideration arguing against employee choice is that disease risks also extend to offspring.
See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
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maintenance and conflict with statutory measures intended to curb
the proliferation of occupational diseases.2"9
The constitutionality of both removal21 and wage guarantee 21' pro-
visions has not gone unchallenged. In a comprehensive opinion, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld both medical removal and wage guarantee provisions for the
lead standard in United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall.1 2 The
United States Supreme Court in American Textile Manufacturers Inst.
Inc. v. Donovan,213 however, remanded the wage guarantee provi-
sions of the cotton dust standard to the Secretary of Labor 214 because
the agency "failed to make the necessary determination or statement
of reasons that its wage guarantee requirement is related to the achieve-
ment of a safe and healthful working environment. ' 21  The Court
did not state that wage guarantee provisions were impermissible,
although the issue of whether OSHA was vested with the authority
to promulgate wage guarantee provisions was left open.21 6
Two key arguments in support of a wage guarantee program would
be available to the agency proposing a mandated genetic monitoring
program. First, if the employer were allowed to transfer employees
to alternative settings, but were not forced to guarantee wages, no
incentive would exist for maintaining a safe workplace. No mandate
requiring that the workplace be made absolutely safe exists.217 When
the employer's dilemma is between wage guarantee obligations or im-
proving the safety of the workplace, the advantages to the employer
of improving the safety of the workplace are evident. In a competitive
marketplace where costs of worker injury and disease must be borne
by the employer, elimination of unsafe conditions will enhance an
employer's ability to participate in a competitive market.2 8
Secondly, wage guarantee programs also assist in assuring employee
participation in a genetic monitoring program. As noted earlier, 1 9
209. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §429.11; see also supra note 1.
210. United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (lead
standard case).
211. Id.; see also American Textile Manufacturers Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490
(1981) (cotton dust standard case).
212. 647 F.2d 1189, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
213. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
214. Id. at 541.
215. Id. at 537-38.
216. Id. at 537.
217. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 641 (1980).
218. Cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18 (1975). In Turner Elkhorn
Mining, the Court notes that even if a regulation imposes a substantial burden on an employer,
it is for Congress to choose how the burden should be distributed. Id. at 18. As long as the
decision is "rational," the Court will not upset the scheme chosen by Congress. Id. at 19.
219. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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medical surveillance programs typically are optional to employees. If
workers were faced with the alternative of being transferred to a lower
paying position or of having their hours cut based upon test results,
incentives to participate would be lacking. Accordingly, wage guarantee
programs would encourage employee participation in genetic monitoring
programs. In addition to disclosure, removal, and wage guarantee pro-
visions, a compelled genetic monitoring program should also encom-
pass provisions requiring that test result data be submitted to OSHA.
C. Test Results Reporting
One of the concomitant benefits of a compelled genetic monitoring
program is the ability of the administrative agency to obtain addi-
tional data about workplace safety. While standards for worker ex-
posures to chemicals are developed based on the compilation of the
best scientific data available, data to determine whether the prescribed
standards are sufficient to create a safe working environment are lack-
ing. Since one of the legislative directives under OSHA is continued
research for the purpose of improving occupational safety and health,22 °
a compelled program should not be enacted absent a specific provi-
sion for data submission by employers. Under the California Ad-
ministrative Code, Cal-OSHA has a right of access to relevant ex-
posure and medical records. 221 The Code, however, does not man-
date that employers submit information.222
A wage guarantee and medical removal program may be a positive
incentive for employers to enhance the safety of the workplace. Some
employers, however, may opt to incur the liability attendant to medical
removal and wage guarantee and forego improvements in the
220. California Labor Code section 6353 provides, "The division shall conduct continuing
research into methods, means, operations, techniques, processes and practices necessary for
improvement of occupational safety and health of employees." CAL. AnafrN. CODE, tit. 8, R.
3204(a). "Access" is defined as the "right and opportunity to examine and copy." Id. R.
3204(c)(1). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§56-56.37, (Confidentiality of Medical Information Act);
See Review of Selected 1981 California Legislation, 13 PAc. L.J. 713, 717 (1982) (for a general
review of the provisions of the Act pertaining to disclosure of medical information by employers).
Under all existing monitoring program, employees have access to their medical records. E.g.,
CAL. ADmN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5208(j2)(C), 5210(m)(2), 5212(p)(3)(B), 5213(q)(4)(B), 5214(o)(4)(B),
5216(n)(4)(B). Under the provisions of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, disclosure
of the contents of an employee medical file is impermissible without employee authorization
except in narrowly defined circumstances. CAL. Crv. CODE §56.20(c). One of the exceptions
provides for the release when compelled by another provision of the law. Id. §52.20(c)(1).
221. See CAL. ADmwN. CODE, tit. 8, R. 5208(j)(2)(C), 5210(m)(2), 5212(p)(3)(A-B),
5213(q)(4)(A-B), 5214(o)(4)(A), 5216(n)(4)(A).
222. Id. R. 5208(j)(2)(C), 5210(m)(2), 5212(p)(3)(A-B), 5213(q)(4)(A-B), 5214(o)(4)(A),
5216(n)(4)(A).
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workplace, particularly if the costs of improvements required a ma-
jor capital outlay or product alteration. Consequently, if a genetic
monitoring program is to achieve one of its primary objectives,
maintenance of worker health, data submission must be a compo-
nent of the administrative regulations.
CONCLUSION
Medical laboratory tests that can aid workers in discovering whether
their health has been affected by exposures encountered in the
workplace have now been developed. These tests are performed to iden-
tify a worker's increased susceptibility to diseases such as cancer or
the production of birth defects in offspring. Although disagreement
exists within the scientific community about whether the tests accurately
predict increased susceptibility, a consensus among researchers is not
required by the courts to incorporate a mandate for tests into a medical
surveillance program.
This comment has demonstrated that a genetic monitoring program
should be adopted by administrative regulation for those industries
that generate exposures that are dangerous to worker health. If genetic
monitoring is not compelled, the decision of whether to include or ex-
clude monitoring from an employee medical surveillance program is
discretionary with the employer. An employee will be protected only
if the employer elects to conduct genetic monitoring and implements
a program that provides for full disclosure and also incorporates a
medical removal and salary retention program.
Absent these provisions, employees who contract disease or who
are terminated because of genetic structure are hampered in their efforts
to recover from the employer. If an employer elects not to conduct
genetic monitoring, the interest of the Legislature in reducing occupa-
tional and genetic disease and in maintaining a safe and healthy
workplace is impaired.
For a compulsory genetic monitoring program to be successful, the
program must be designed to encourage employee participation.
Medical surveillance programs traditionally have been optional for
employees, and regulations forcing employee participation are not likely
to be upheld because they would offend employees' constitutionally
protected privacy interests. Accordingly, a compelled genetic monitoring
program encompassing the following provisions should be adopted
by administrative regulation: (1) a requirement that employers fully
disclose information about testing being performed and the results
of the tests; (2) procedures for removal of the worker from the site
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of the hazardous exposure when test results identify disease suscep-
tibility; (3) a system assuring salary and seniority retention during
the removal period; and (4) a requirement that statistical data com-
piled from test results be submitted to an appropriate governmental
agency. The implementation of this proposal would be a significant
step toward the improvement of workplace safety and amelioration
of occupationally induced disease.
Linda J. Seifert
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